An Entrepreneurial Innovation: Mega Cooperatives by Dana, L.P. & Schoeman, J.
 Volume 4, No. 1, 2010  67 
An Entrepreneurial Innovation: Mega Cooperatives 
 
 
 
Leo Paul Dana *and Jason Schoeman** 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Cooperatives internationally are pursuing horizontal and vertical integration at time when 
businesses globally are increasingly focussing on limited sets of value adding activities in order 
to satisfy customer needs and maintain competitive advantage. This paper explores this seeming 
paradox by looking at a recently formed mega dairy cooperative, which has monopolistic control 
over the New Zealand domestic and export markets. The paper assesses the changes and 
challenges for the dairy cooperative in its infant years before assessing the relative performance 
of the cooperative against several key performance indicators 
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1.     Introduction 
 
At a time when external environmental forces are leading businesses around the world 
towards focusing their operations and decreasing their horizontal and vertical integration, why are 
cooperatives moving in the opposite direction? Globalisation, the deregulation of economic 
markets, technological convergence and the evolution of the internet, is leading to firms 
downsizing and specialising on limited sets of value adding activities (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 
2000; Vervest, 2005). Traditional manufacturing firm dominated hierarchies are being replaced by 
complex cooperative relationships, fundamentally changing the way in which firms operate and 
compete (Achrol & Kotler, 2006). Paradoxically, research has identified agricultural cooperatives 
trending towards larger cooperatives with higher degrees of vertical and horizontal integration, 
particularly in developed countries (Barton, Schroeder, & Featherstone, 1993; Hedberg, 2004; 
Misra, Carley, & Fletcher, 1993; Sankaran & Luxton, 2003; Schroeder, 1992; Sykuta & Cook, 
2001). The size and international operation of these new cooperative structures pose unique 
problems and challenges for managers. They require new and unique skills, and management 
competencies. Examining this seeming paradox is the purpose of this research paper.  
The agricultural industry in New Zealand (NZ) is similar to that of many other nations. The 
industry consists of many small sized producers (farmers) producing relatively homogeneous 
products, which compete against other producers both domestically and internationally. The 
process of converting the raw products leaving the farm gate into desirable consumer products 
and exporting the products internationally, is an expensive and complicated process in which 
economies of scale are critically important to financial success. The agricultural industry is a 
significant driver of NZ’s economy, earning 30.8% of the total export revenue and contributing 
12.6% of NZ’s gross domestic product (GDP) (EconData Pty. Ltd, 2008; New Zealand debt 
management office, 2009). Twenty years of economic reforms has removed all but one of NZ’s 
government established marketing boards, has forced NZ cooperatives into international 
marketing and business. The importance of the agriculture industry’s contribution to NZ’s 
economy cannot be overlooked, and research needs to critically assess these changes to ensure the 
continued success of this industry. This research paper reviews literature to examine the changing 
roles in the management of cooperatives, and the moving from a micro to a macro marketing 
approach. Content analysis is conducted to look at the successful mega dairy cooperatives 
Fonterra. Changes in the operation, problems, managerial tasks, strategic direction and marketing 
activities are discussed and analyses of key performance indicators are presented.  
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2.    Literature Review 
 
2.1    Cooperatives 
 
The cooperation between agriculture producers to exploit market opportunities has a long 
history. Karki (2006) identities that archaeological discoveries provide evidence that agricultural 
cooperative structures have existed since the time of Babylonians and Ancient Egyptians. Present 
day research can be traced back to the 1800s (Finlay, 1896; Kies, 1891). Cobia (1989) as cited in 
Karki (2006) identifies three distinguishing features of cooperatives: firstly, those who own the 
cooperative are those who use the cooperative; secondly, those who use the cooperative control 
the cooperative; lastly, those who use the cooperative are the primary benefactors of the 
cooperative. The International Co-operative Alliance (1995) identifies a list of seven principles by 
which cooperatives are governed; open and voluntary membership; democratic member control; 
member’s economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and 
information; co-operation among co-operatives; concern for the community. The primary 
objective of cooperatives is to increase the economic wellbeing of the producer/owner of the 
cooperative (Barton, et al., 1993). This is achieved through purchasing individual farm’s outputs 
and marketing them collectively. Benefits accrue through the reduction in transaction costs and 
increased efficiencies. These benefits are distributed to the owner/producers usually though higher 
farm gate prices and the redistribution of earnings. Barton et al. (1993) acknowledges that the 
objectives of cooperatives are commonly viewed as distinct from that of investor orientated firms, 
a view shared by Karki (2006).  
Increased economies of scale in cooperatives are highlighted as the primary benefit of 
operating in cooperative structures. Increased economies of scale translated into lower per unit 
costs during production and processing of raw produce, and the distribution of products to 
retailers and end users (Barton, et al., 1993; Hill, 2007; Schroeder, 1992). Other benefits include 
broader product ranges, stimulation of demand for outputs, securing access to production inputs, 
innovation and the sharing of risk between cooperative partners (Barton, et al., 1993). Karki 
(2006) explains that in developed countries cooperatives are focused on increasing the value of 
their products, while cooperatives in developing countries focus on increasing the volume of 
production. Historically, agriculture cooperatives have been primarily focused on serving the 
domestic market with exporting being carried out by government initiated marketing boards, with 
the exception of speciality products (Sankaran & Luxton, 2003). Deregulation of markets and  
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economic policies coupled with the forces of globalisation, has created new market opportunities 
for cooperatives (Karki, 2006). This article will focus on the aspects of those cooperatives which 
engage in international activity. However, even cooperatives which operate solely domestically, 
are also affected by the international competition, because if the opportunity exists other nations 
will export and compete directly with local producers.  
2.2    Changing Structure of Cooperatives 
Cobia (1989) and The International Co-operative Alliance (1995) describes the traditional 
cooperative formation. However, due to external forces, there are now several variations on the 
traditional structure. Consistent with Doyon (2005) this section presents three general models of 
“new” cooperative structures; Public Limited Cooperatives, New Generation Cooperatives and the 
Hybrid Model. The Public Limited Company cooperative structure is essentially a cooperative 
which has raised extra equity by means of selling a portion of its business to a non supplier owner. 
This can be done by either a, placing a portion of the cooperative on the stock exchange or 
seeking a corner stone investor. Usually, the new structure will have two boards of directors, one 
representing the cooperative and one representing the company. The cooperative’s board still have 
their voice on the company board of directors, however the influence of the privately owned 
company governance structure is said to provide greater levels of flexibility and efficiency 
(Doyon, 2005). The New Generation Cooperative structure is similar to that of the traditional 
cooperative structure, except there is closed membership rather than open membership. Upon 
membership to the cooperative members, make a significant capital contribution, normally by 
means of the purchase of shares in the cooperative relative to their use of its resources. 
Additionally there is also generally an obligation to supply/use the cooperative. New Generation 
Cooperative structures are said to have better access to capital than that of the traditional 
cooperative structure. However, they are still constrained in accessing additional finance. The 
Hybrid Model of cooperatives has governance and capital structures, which are blended from both 
cooperative and private company characteristics. Voting occurs both on per share (private) and 
per supplier basis (cooperative). The board of directors contain both elected members 
(cooperative) and external members (private). Lastly, hybrid model cooperatives utilise external 
capital sources through interest bearing capital notes, which bear no voting rights.   
2.3    Changing Business Environment  
The liberation and deregulation of markets and economic policies has thrust many 
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 cooperatives into international business (Sankaran & Luxton, 2003). In NZ, cooperatives now 
replace many of the pre-existing marketing boards, which governments had granted monopoly 
control over the exporting of specific agricultural products. Internationally as well as within NZ, 
there has been an identified trend towards larger cooperatives, through mergers and acquisitions 
(Barton, et al., 1993; Hedberg, 2004; Misra, et al., 1993; Sankaran & Luxton, 2003; Schroeder, 
1992; Sykuta & Cook, 2001). The larger cooperatives have been shown to produce greater 
benefits for its owners/users, principally through the attainment of greater economies of scale 
(Hedberg, 2004; Sankaran & Luxton, 2003; Schroeder, 1992). Economies of scale become 
increasingly important in an increasingly liberated and deregulated global market place. 
Cooperatives can no longer settle for being efficient relative to their domestic competition; rather 
cooperatives need to ensure they are competitive relative to their increasing international 
competition. Due to the geographic isolation and limited size of New Zealand, achieving the 
desired production, processing, and distribution efficiencies, has required a high level of 
horizontal and vertical integration. This has resulted in the formation of the ‘mega’ dairy 
cooperative Fonterra, and the attempted formation of a similar mega cooperative for the sheep and 
beef industry, commonly referred to as the ‘mega’ meat merger. Fonterra now effectively holds a 
monopoly control of the NZ dairy industry. A similar position would have also been held if the 
proposed mega meat merger was successful. 
2.4    The Transition from Micro to Macro Marketing 
The size and international operation of these new mega cooperative structures, requires new 
and unique skills and management competencies. The required shift in managerial operation can 
be viewed as a change from micromarketing to macromarketing. Zif (1980) and Hunt (1977) 
describe the transition of a firm to macromarketing as when the firm is said to be high on either 
Hunts (1976) dimension of the ‘level of aggregation’, or  Moyer’s (1972) dimension of ‘impact on 
society’. Both the mega cooperative structures have/would have had a significant effect on NZ’s 
society as a whole, both through their direct responsibility for the international competitiveness of 
two of the largest industries in the NZ economy, and the resulting impact on the domestic market 
supply and price. The necessary changes can be viewed from Zif’s (1980) study of the managerial 
approach to macromarketing. Macromarketing managers responsibilities can be broadly defined 
by asking two questions: Has central marketing authority been established? and is management 
responsible for directing the flow of goods and services? The result is a two by two matrix which 
attempts categorise a two dimensional continuum into four neat categories.  
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  Central Marketing Authority 
  Yes No 
Directing the flow of 
goods and services 
Y
es
 Comprehensive    
Macro-management 
Joint micro/macro 
management 
N
o Central coordination 
and/or regulation 
Specialized macro 
management 
Figure 1 Classification of managerial responsibilities  
Source: Zif (1980) 
 
Joint micro/macro management involves the directing and flow of socially important 
products from a near monopoly position, but without the central authority over marketing 
activities. Through their dominant market positions, these firms marketing activities can have 
significant societal consequences and therefore their freedom of actions is reduced (Zif, 1980). 
The comprehensive micromanagement perspective is most common in communist countries. 
However, Zif (1980) identifies that there are also comparable examples in the western developed 
world. The most common examples are the government-sanctioned marketing boards, which have 
been mentioned previously in this article. The New Zealand economic reforms of the 1980s led, to 
the dissolution of many of these marketing boards, resulting in a lack of a coordinated 
international marketing effort of many New Zealand agricultural products  (Le Cren, Lyons, & 
Dana, 2009). The formation of large mega cooperatives representing a vast proportion the nations 
processors of specific agricultural goods, are filling the void to ensure sufficient efficiencies and 
economies of scale to secure the international competitiveness of the dairy industry.  
 Zif’s (1980) study of the management approach to macro marketing, can also be used to 
examine the managerial objectives of these mega cooperatives. The aggregate marketing 
behaviour and societal consequences of macro marketing requires managers to balance several 
organisational goals simultaneously. An examination of marketing boards by Zif and Israeli 
(1978) found that the basic goals of these organisations can be grouped into the following 
generalised categories: profitability, productivity, market development, social responsibility, and 
innovation. While these organisational goals are recognised to be similar to that of 
micromarketing, Zif (1980) highlights that their scope is enlarged and their relative importance is 
different, particularly the goals of profitability and social responsibility.  Profitability at the 
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 Macro marketing level is not only concerned with the attainment of desired profit margins, but 
also how these profits are distributed within the vertically and horizontally integrated organisation. 
Social responsibility is regarded as one of the greatest challenges faced by macro marketers. The 
goals consist of economic as well as non-economic sub goals, which are dynamic and often 
poorly defined. Social responsibility often receives public attention and usually conflicts with 
short-term profitability. Managing these diverse goals therefore presents a challenge for macro 
marketing practitioners, and it is assumed that managers will use vey general terms when stating 
goals and evaluating performances.   
  Managerial control 
  Yes No 
Cultivating             
public support 
Y
es
 Social performance 
orientation Political orientation 
N
o Business orientation Passive orientation 
Figure 2 Managerial objectives: A dual macro marketing concept 
Source: Zif (1980) 
 
Zif (1980, 39) explores the notion of a “dual macro marketing concept” to manage the often 
conflicting requirements of macromarketing. This concept recognises that in macro marketing the 
exchange process occupies both the market place and the political arena, and managerial tasks 
associated with each exchange process differ considerably. In the market place, mangers are 
expected to maintain and exercise control through marketing organisation, information systems, 
investment projects, research and development, marketing mix decisions and product quality 
decisions. The political arena consists of three distinct groups; the public-at-large, political 
intermediaries and special interest groups. Gaining support from these groups is regarded as an 
imperative for macro marketers in three common situations: the determination of objectives and 
public support, the seeking of approval for capital investment and organisational or marketplace 
action, and the negotiation of transactions with government representatives. Zif (1980, 40) 
therefore proposes a two dimensional continuum to represent managerial objectives given the 
relative priority of managerial control and cultivation of public support. 
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3.    Formation of Fonterra 
Fonterra cooperative group was established in late 2001 through the merger of the NZ 
Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative Diaries. Fonterra controls 95% of NZ’s total milk production, 
accounts for 20% of NZ’s total export receipts and represents 7% of the nations GDP. Fonterra 
exports to over 140 countries and is the second largest exporter of milk products internationally. 
The goals of Fonterra at formation were: 
 
 To lead the world wide race to develop dairy products potential, through nutritional 
products ranging from quality food ingredients to FMCGs, in order to meet the changing 
preferences of the global market place. 
 To enable the scale in New Zealand’s milk processing and international export 
marketing, to enhance and unlock efficiencies, to increase the returns provided to 
farmers. 
 
Currently Fonterra has 10724 (2333 fewer than 2002) owner/suppliers and a multi layer 
corporate structure. The business is involved in the production, processing, and marketing of New 
Zealand dairy products.  
 
3.1    Fonterra’s Governance Structure 
 
The governance structure of Fonterra includes four key sets of players which are 
represented in Figure 3. The New Zealand dairy farmers are the owners and users of the Fonterra 
mega cooperative group. The shareholder’s council purpose is to represent the interests of the 
farmer/suppliers. The 35 shareholders on the council are elected by dairy farmers and represent 35 
identified regions of the country. The board of directors’ responsibility is for the strategic 
direction of Fonterra. The board consists of 13 directors, nine of which are elected by the 
shareholders and the board appoints the remaining four. The four appointed directors are said to 
provide the skill and competences needed to manage a global company. Lastly, the milk 
commissioner is appointed by the shareholders council to resolve disputes between the 
shareholders council and the board of directors (Fonterra, 2009). The control which the farmers 
have over the board of directors (electing 9 of the 14 directors), is criticised for limiting the 
technical knowledge and expertise needed to run a global firm (Doyon, 2005). This is a common 
criticism of cooperative governance structures (Beverland, 2007; Doyon, 2005) 
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Figure 3 Fonterra governance structure 
Source: Fonterra (2009) 
 
Before the establishment of Fonterra, the NZ dairy industry consisted of four major dairy 
cooperatives; New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Dairies, Tatua and Westland. The largest two 
cooperatives, New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Dairy, collectively represented around 90% of 
NZ’s milk production. These cooperatives marketed their products internationally through the 
New Zealand Dairy Board, while domestically they marketed and distributed their product 
independently. This structure was seen as inefficient and dysfunctional, due to years of 
government intervention, internal politics and poor governance (Ohlsson, 2004). In late 2001, the 
larger two cooperatives (New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Dairy) merged together to form 
Fonterra (Ohlsson, 2004). The formation of Fonterra established a company with monopolistic 
control over the domestic and export markets NZ dairy products, processing 90% of NZ’s milk 
production and 95% of NZ’s dairy exports (including the exporting of products from Synlait and 
Westland) (Le Cren, et al., 2009). Regulation however ensures the fair pricing of raw milk 
supplies to competitor processors. 
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Figure 4 NZ dairy industry structure before the formation of Fonterra 
Source: Le Cren et al. (2009) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 NZ dairy industry structure after the formation of Fonterra 
Source: Adapted from Le Cren et al. (2009)  
 
4.    Changes at Fonterra 
 
The next section of this report looks at the key business changes and challenges faced by the 
new mega cooperative Fonterra. Data was collected via the use a content analysis strategy. 
According to Hall and Valentin (2005) content analysis is “an observational research method used 
to systematically evaluate the actual and symbolic content in all forms of recorded 
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 communication” (191). Such analysis can be conducted on a variety of data forms, particularly in 
mass communication media which includes web based newspapers, tabloids and magazine articles 
(Hall & Valentin, 2005; Harwood & Garry, 2003). This report utilised the content analysis of 
various news sources available over the World Wide Web.  
 
Upon formation of Fonterra, management and directors needed to deal with a company 
which doubled in size in almost every facet almost instantly. This represented a significant 
increase in the level of aggregation of the organisation relative to the NZ dairy industry as a whole, 
and a move toward macro marketing (Hunt, 1976). The Fonterra organisation is often refereed to 
as a monopoly of the NZ Dairy industry (Schroeder, 1992). The near monopoly position of 
Fonterra, makes the management team responsible for a high degree of the direction and control 
of the flow of raw and processed milk products. Additionally it places responsibility on Fonterra 
for the successful marketing of dairy products domestically and internationally. According to Zif 
(1980) this would place Fonterra in a comprehensive macro-management role. The content 
analysis several substantial reviews and changes which Fonterra has made to deal with these 
changes. These were arranged around the following areas; transfer pricing between business 
units/subsidiaries; foreign currency hedging; production efficiencies; logistic optimisation; and 
consideration of the NZ brand.  
 
Fonterra’s new macro marketing responsibilities has produced a potential conflict between 
cultivating public support and meeting organisational goals (Zif & Israeli, 1978). Zif (1980, 39) 
identifies the solution as a “dual macro marketing concept” to manage the conflicting 
requirements. Cultivating public support for Fonterra’s actions involves the careful management 
of various parties with sometimes conflicting interests. The content analysis revealed the 
following stakeholders which Fonterra relied upon for public support; environment groups, the 
Commerce Commission, central government, owners/suppliers and the general public. Fonterra 
was frequently questioned by environmental groups, the Commerce Commission, and its 
owners/suppliers. Through Fonterra’s early years, the competences of its managers were 
frequently questioned and there was substantial evidence of boardroom disagreement which 
resulted in several directors resigning from the board.  
 
The content analysis revealed a strong focus on the building of international business 
relationships. Joint venture, acquisitions, and the establishment of foreign subsidiaries were 
common occurrences, and were viewed as critical for the ongoing growth and performance of  
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Fonterra. The problem with the ongoing international expansion of Fonterra was the lack of 
access to capital finance. This is common among growing businesses, but is accentuated due to 
the general capital constraints of cooperative structures (Barton, et al., 1993; Beverland, 2007; 
Fazzari & Petersen, 1993). The constraint of access to capital funding, is two fold for cooperatives. 
Firstly cooperatives have few options when seeking new capital funding since few 
owners/farmers are willing to make extra investments and the investment of capital by outsiders is 
normally not allowed under cooperatives’ constitutions. Secondly, cooperatives are restricted in 
their ability to retain earning because of the strong voice of the owners/suppliers over the election 
of board directors (Barton, et al., 1993). These constraints have led to several cooperatives 
amending their constitution with agreement from their owners/farmers, to allow for external 
capital funding. Doyon (2005) presents these new cooperatives as Public Limited Cooperatives, 
New Generation Cooperatives and the Hybrid Model cooperative. Fonterra fits the Hybrid 
Cooperative Model for its capital sourcing. Fonterra sources outside equity using interest bearing 
capital notes sold to the public, which bear no voting rights.  Access to sufficient capital remains a 
key challenge for Fonterra, and was reported by many in the content analysis to be constraining 
the growth of Fonterra. Currently Fonterra is seeking support from farmers for a new capital 
structure which will allow Fonterra’s owners/farmers to trade shares with each other to provide 
greater security for Fonterra’s capital structure (Law link, 2009).  
5.    Fonterra’s Performance 
This section assesses the performance of Fonterra over several important key performance 
indicators. Primarily, information was sourced from Fonterra’s annual reports, however 
comparison statistics are sourced and included where relevant. The first graph represents 
Fonterra’s efficiency in processing raw milk into refined dairy products, and its ability to generate 
sales revenue for its owners/suppliers. The processing costs line shows the average cost of goods 
sold (COGS) for each kilogram of milk solids (KGMS) (Fonterra, 2009). The COGS figure 
excludes the cost of the raw milk, as this milk price also represents the shareholders return for 
investment. Additionally all prices have been converted to 2009 prices using the dairy PPI 
statistics to account for the various cost of production inputs (EconData Pty. Ltd, 2008). This line 
shows substantial support for Fonterra providing increased economies of scale during the 
transformation of raw milks to finished products, with a 46% decrease in 2004 the cost of 
production compared to previous year (2003). This represents a significant efficiency gain, and is 
in line with the expectations set on the formation of Fonterra. Fonterra however has failed to 
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 continue its efficiency gain as it increased it milk production over the following years. 
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Figure 6 Processing and distribution efficiency of Fonterra   
Data Sources:  Fonterra (2009), EconData Pty. Ltd (2008). 
 
The second line represents the revenue which Fonterra generates from each KGMS it 
collects from its farmers. The revenue figures have been adjusted for inflation, and are therefore 
representative of $2009 (EconData Pty. Ltd, 2008). It is interesting that the revenue generated per 
KGMS has declined over time, while commodity prices have generally increased. There are 
several possible reasons for this; the effect of the strengthening NZ dollar eroding the gains from 
increased commodity prices; possible move to products with lower value added components; 
international subsidiaries receiving lower payment for their output. This trend line is concerning 
however. It is expected that Fonterra principally manufacturing in a developed country like NZ, 
would be focusing on value added products to generate more value from each unit of its 
owners/suppliers output (Karki, 2006).  
   
The report now looks at Fonterra’s performance measured by farm gate prices, which was 
one of the reasons for the formation of Fonterra. Increase payment for raw product is highlighted 
as one of the key means by which cooperative’s redistribute the benefits of belonging to the 
cooperative (Barton, et al., 1993). Since Fonterra controls 90% of NZ’s milk production, there is 
no market price for milk in NZ. Instead, a working group consisting of Fonterra directors and 
external representatives’ set a fair milk price which is externally audited (Fonterra, 2009). This 
price is shown in nominal terms on the graph below, and is read on the right hand axis. 
Additionally, the price has been standardised and compared against that of NZ’s three largest  
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competitors (US, Australia and the UK) (Le Cren, et al., 2009). The cooperative has managed to 
maintain parity with its international competitors, of which some receive substantial government 
assistance (Le Cren, et al., 2009).  However, Fonterra has failed to significantly increase the milk 
price payout to its suppliers/owners.  
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Figure 7 Farm gate milk prices 
Data Sources: Fonterra (2009), EconData Pty. Ltd (2008),  Dairy Australia (2009), Dairy Co Datum (2009),  CLAL.it 
(2009) 
 
Another means by which farmers/owners benefit from being part of the Fonterra 
cooperative is though an increase in the fair share price. The fair share price is set in a similar way 
to the milk purchase price. A specialist working committee determines the price annually, with 
the price being externally audited. A farm must own a share for each KGMS produced by the 
farm each year. The shares represent each farms investment in Fonterra (Fonterra, 2009). This 
ownership structure is common in many new generation cooperatives (Doyon, 2005). The graph 
below shows the annual percentage increase/decrease in the value of the fair share price, as well 
as the annual percentage increase of the NZX50. The NZX50 provides a benchmark for the 
opportunity cost when investing in Fonterra shares. The graph shows a fairly consistent increase 
in value of around 10-15% over the first four years since the formation of Fonterra, followed by a 
dramatic drop over the last two years. This drop is most probably due to the global recession and 
is consistent with the performance of the NZX50. Over the last seven years, the value of Fonterra 
shares has increased by 15% compared to an increase in the value of the NZX50 of 25%. 
However, care must be taken to recognise the value of the annual milk payout in comparison to 
potential dividends. Lastly, it will be interesting to see how Fonterra’s share price compares to 
that of the NZX50 when the world emerges out of the recession. 
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Figure 8 Return on investment 
Data Source:  Fonterra (2009), NZSE (2009) . 
 
One of the government mandates for allowing the formation of Fonterra to bypass the 
Commerce Commission, was that the dairy industry is of significant importance to the nation 
though its substantial contribution to the New Zealand economy (30.8%  of total export revenue 
and 12.6% GDP) (EconData Pty. Ltd, 2008; New Zealand debt management office, 2009; 
Sankaran & Luxton, 2003). The formation of the mega cooperative was predicted to 
increase/maintain the competitiveness of New Zealand’s dairy industry (Sankaran & Luxton, 
2003). The graph below shows the value of dairy exports before and after the formation of 
Fonterra. There appears to be a greater annual increase in the value of dairy exports after the 
formation of Fonterra. However, there is also greater variation in the value of the exports. 
 
 
Figure 9 Value of New Zealand’s dairy exports  
Data Source: EconData Pty Ltd (2008) 
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The last performance indicator used to access Fonterra’s performance was the investment 
activity in foreign markets. The above details the significant foreign entities partially owned by 
Fonterra. This type of foreign investment by Fonterra is not typical of cooperatives and reflects 
the business side of the cooperative (Doyon, 2005). This investment provides additional revenue 
and economies of scale to Fonterra and its owner/suppliers. The investments provide offshore 
milk production, product development, research and development work and access to foreign 
markets. The above table shows a significant amount of international partnerships and joint 
ventures since the establishment of the Fonterra foreign 
 
Table 1 Table of Fonterra’s substantial foreign investments 
Data Source: Fonterra (2009)       *Acquire/established before the formation of Fonterra 
 
6.    Discussion 
 
The changes have fundamentally changed and complicated the managerial objectives and 
tasks of cooperative entities. Within the new environment, there is an apparent conflict between 
the different goals of the various stakeholders of the organisation. Zif’s (1980) dual marketing 
concept suggests, that a dominant confliction will be between the cultivating public support and 
the managerial control of the organisation. Additionally Barton et al. (1993) highlights the issues 
present in determining the fair distribution of profits between the various partners of the 
cooperatives. With the high degree of horizontal and vertical integration within mega cooperative 
Dairy Partners America Argentina S.A Argentia 50% 
DPA Manufacturing Holdings Limited Burmuda 50% 
Dairy Partners Americas Brazil Limitada* Brazil 50% 
Shijiazhuang San Lu Company Limited China 43% 
Ecajugos S.a Ecuador 50% 
AFF P/S Denmark 25% 
DMV Fonterra Excipients GmbH & Co KG Germany 50% 
Dairy Industries (Jamaica) Limited* Jamaica 50% 
Dairiconcepts Management, L.P. USA 50% 
Dairiconceptss Management, L.L.C. USA 50% 
Corporacion Inlaca, C.A Venezula 25% 
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 structures, managers may face increased challenges in the integration of different cooperative 
partners. Therefore, managers will need to consider a wide range of relational issues and 
objectives when integrating and maintaining such complex cooperatives, to ensure the successful 
completion of the new structure goals.  
 
The assessment of Fonterra’s performance produced mixed results. The most encouraging 
piece of evidence to support the formation of a mega cooperative was the economies of scale, 
which Fonterra was able to realise two years after formation. The 45% drop in cost of goods sold 
per KGMS (excluding the price of raw milk) was achieved though greater processing and 
distribution efficiencies. The cost of goods sold has remained relatively, stable since. This poses 
the question where will future cost savings come form since economies of scale in the New 
Zealand market are effectively exhausted, with Fonterra already processing 90% of NZ’s dairy 
production (Fonterra, 2009). Possible answers are; through technological advances in processing; 
technological advantages to increase farms productivity; and international expansion and 
investment. This report found Fonterra to be heavily involved in the investment in international 
joint ventures, acquisitions and international subsidiaries, and the recognised view that NZ farms 
produce are comparatively small and shrinking proportion of the world’s total dairy production. A 
less encouraging statistic was however, the steady decline in the revenue generated by Fonterra 
per KGMS produced. This drop is particularly concerning since cooperatives operating in 
developed economies are said to be focused on value added products (Karki, 2006). The 
assessment of farmers return on investment for being part of the Fonterra group did not produce 
any compelling evidence to support investment in Fonterra. Since the formation of Fonterra, the 
company has failed to produce return for investors greater than that of the NZX50, and the farm 
gate prices for milk solids has not significantly out performed the other major milk producing 
nations.  
 
7.    Conclusion 
 
To summarise, the changes in the external operating environment of agriculture 
cooperatives produced by the liberation and deregulation of economic policies, has motivated 
some cooperatives to merge into mega cooperatives (Barton, et al., 1993; Doyon, 2005). These 
mega cooperatives involve a large degree of horizontal and vertical integration in order to ensure 
sufficient efficiencies and economies of scale, to secure the international competitiveness of the 
owners/users (Doyon, 2005). The new monopoly position of these mega cooperatives and 
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 international marketing activities has transformed their managers responsibilities from a 
micromarketing approach to a macromarketing approach. These changes have the desired effect 
of moving competition from between domestic cooperatives to between international businesses. 
The success of the Fonterra Mega dairy cooperative was found to produce significant gains in 
economies of scale. However, the information from the other key performance indicators did not 
provide conclusive support for the mega cooperative structure. These findings are limited by the 
resources available for research, and therefore should be interpreted with care. Additionally, the 
Fonterra cooperative is only eight years old and further benefits may take time.  
 
This research does provide an interesting area of study as cooperatives continue to merge to 
achieve economies of scale and adapt their governance and management structure in the face of 
changing external environmental forces. Interesting points of further research would include; the 
challenges of group formation during the merger of cooperatives; the relative performance of the 
new cooperative structures identified by Doyon (2005); An extensive study of the economic 
impact of a monopolistic cooperative.  
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